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3On 15 January the House of Commons rejected the 
European Union’s offer of an orderly Brexit by an 
astonishing 230 votes. While many British politicians 
and media have continued to talk glibly about the 
importance of “taking ‘no deal’ off the table”, the 
defeat of the government’s policy has plunged the UK 
and the EU into a deep crisis.  
The only way to prevent ‘no deal’ is 
to do a deal, and the only deal on the 
table is that agreed between her and the 
European Council on 25 November.
It remains true, as Prime Minister May says, that the 
only way to prevent ‘no deal’ is to do a deal, and that 
the only deal on the table is that agreed between her 
and the European Council on 25 November.1
As things stand, Brexit will happen without a deal on 
29 March, and no unilateral British legislation can 
alter that date. Unless the UK revokes the Article 50 
secession process entirely, finally and irrevocably, the 
EU will cut off the UK as a member state at midnight on 
that Friday. An extension of Article 50 is possible, but, 
as we discuss below, fraught with difficulty. 
That the EU institutions refuse to reopen the legal text 
of the Withdrawal Agreement is an indication of how 
difficult it has been to negotiate with the UK in the 
first place. Ingenuity and generosity on behalf of the 
EU can hardly compensate for the shambolic nature of 
the UK’s efforts to end its membership. For the EU the 
risk of collateral damage rises every day the deal is not 
ratified by the UK parliament.
IMPROVING THE POLITICAL DECLARATION
And yet. The EU is willing to show flexibility 
over the Political Declaration on the future 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union.2 This is the key document that 
will accompany the Withdrawal Agreement. It was 
published on 22 November and endorsed by the 
European Council and the British government.3
As the Political Declaration is open for modification, 
I have made a proposal of a new draft, the full text of 
which can be found at www.andrewduff.eu 
As the Political Declaration is open for 
modification, I have made a proposal of 
a new draft, the full text of which can be 
found at www.andrewduff.eu
The proposed draft is informed by the conclusions of 
the European Council of 13 December, the exchange 
of letters between Prime Minister May and Presidents 
Tusk and Juncker of 14 January, the ‘meaningful vote’ 
in the House of Commons to reject the Withdrawal 
Agreement on 15 January, the subsequent vote (Brady 
amendment) of 29 January, which instructed the 
government to renegotiate the Irish backstop, the 
debate in the European Parliament on 30 January, the 
recent exchange of letters between Mr Corbyn and 
Mrs May, the joint statement of Mr Juncker and Mrs 
May after their Brussels meeting on 7 February, and, 
finally, the Commons debate on 12 February. 
In amending the Declaration one must recall that 
its legal base is Article 50 TEU. The document exists 
only in the context of the UK’s withdrawal from the 
Union. Its purpose is to accompany and elucidate the 
Withdrawal Agreement. 
As far as the EU is concerned, the Declaration is the first 
draft of the Commission’s mandate for the negotiation 
of the future association agreement, but it is not itself 
the legal mandate. The negotiation of the final deal 
can only begin after the UK has ceased to be a member 
state of the Union and will be conducted on a different 
legal base (Article 217 TFEU) and according to different 
procedures (Article 218 TFEU). 
As far as the UK is concerned, the Declaration informs 
the Westminster parliament about the country’s 
direction of travel post-Brexit. It indicates the location 
of Britain’s final landing zone as an ex-member state. 
But it is only the start of the journey, not the arrival. 
AN AWKWARD COMPROMISE
The Political Declaration has been criticised for many 
and contradictory things. It is accused of being at once 
too short and too long, too precise and too imprecise, too 
binding and too lax, too hostile and too accommodating.  
 
The second version of the Declaration 
will have to demonstrate that it has been 
suitably adapted to take into account 
the refusal of the House of Commons to 
ratify the first.
The Declaration as published is self-evidently 
a somewhat awkward compromise between the 
established positions of the EU and the UK. It struggles 
to reflect not only the guidelines of the European 
Council but also the ‘red lines’ of Theresa May.
The second version of the Declaration will have to 
demonstrate that it has been suitably adapted to take 
4into account the refusal of the House of Commons 
to ratify the first. The Commission wants it to be 
more ambitious in terms of content and redrafted to 
deliver a speedier conclusion to the negotiation of the 
association agreement. 
But the EU is also looking to create a deal that attracts 
broad bipartisan support in the Commons. A thin majority 
of Leavers in a second meaningful vote will not be enough 
to ensure the passage of all the legislation needed 
to properly implement the Withdrawal Agreement. 
Remainer votes are also required if the majority is to be, 
as Michel Barnier puts it, “clear and stable”. 
FINDING MIDDLE GROUND
In the light of the Brady amendment, Mrs May continues 
to look for legally binding solutions on the Irish 
backstop that will persuade enough Brexiteers to change 
their mind and back the deal. She has three options, all 
of which have been tried before and rejected by the EU:
q  to introduce a mechanism for the unilateral exit by 
the UK from the backstop;
q  to install a specific time limit to terminate  
the backstop;
q  to invent alternative arrangements that annul  
the need for the backstop. 
It should not be so difficult to identify 
some centre ground on which the 
Labour leadership would be content for 
several of its MPs to rendezvous with 
like-minded Tories. 
Whether or not she succeeds in this improbable 
endeavour, it is clear that as and when the prime 
minister makes concessions to placate the Brexiteers 
she will lose support for the deal among the much 
larger cohort of pro-European MPs. 
There is a hard core of anti-European MPs who will never 
vote for any deal, amended or otherwise, preferring no 
deal. Likewise there is a small group of pro-European 
zealots in favour of a second referendum who seem 
prepared to risk no deal rather than accept any deal. 
Taken together, however, this unholy alliance of dividers 
numbers fewer than 100 MPs – leaving a very large 
number of MPs, including the usually opportunistic 
SNP, ready for reconciliation. Even the more intelligent 
members of the DUP will find it difficult to opt for no deal.
On the face of it, therefore, it should not be so difficult 
to identify some centre ground on which the Labour 
leadership would be content for several of its MPs to 
rendezvous with like-minded Tories. 
MR CORBYN’S LETTER
Jeremy Corbyn’s letter to the prime minister of 6 February 
has unusual importance.4 He drops his previous, rather 
silly demand, cribbed from a failed Brexit minister, 
that the UK must insist post-Brexit on enjoying exactly 
the same benefits as it does as a member state. In his 
late intervention to the Brexit debate, the leader of the 
opposition has five requirements:
1. A permanent and comprehensive UK-wide customs 
union, including alignment with the EU Customs Code, the 
common external tariff, “and an agreement on commercial 
policy that includes a UK say on future EU trade deals”. 
2. Close alignment with the Single Market, underpinned 
by shared institutions and obligations.
3. Dynamic alignment on rights and protections, 
allowing the UK to keep pace with EU standards.
4. Clear commitments on participation in EU agencies 
and programmes.
5. Unambiguous agreements on the details of future 
security arrangements, including the European Arrest 
Warrant and shared databases. 
In her emollient reply to the Labour leader of  
10 February, Mrs May wrote:
“It is good to see that we agree that the UK 
should leave the European Union with a deal 
and that the urgent task at hand is to find a deal 
that honours our commitments to the people 
of Northern Ireland, can command support in 
Parliament and can be negotiated with the EU - 
not to seek an election or second referendum.”
Speaking to the House of Commons on 12 February,  
she confirmed her intention to seek improvements  
to the Political Declaration to which Mr Corbyn could 
lend his support:
“Because the Political Declaration cannot be 
legally binding and in some areas provides for 
a spectrum of outcomes – some Members are 
understandably concerned that they cannot 
be sure precisely what future relationship it 
would lead to. By following through on our 
commitments and giving Parliament that bigger 
say in the mandate for the next phase, we are 
determined to address those concerns.” 
By themselves, the proposals of neither 
Mrs May nor Mr Corbyn are sufficient to 
win a decent majority in the House.
The prime minister promises legislation to entrench 
a commitment to keep abreast with EU standards of 
5workers’ rights, and environmental, health and  
safety protections. 
By themselves, the proposals of neither Mrs May nor 
Mr Corbyn are sufficient to win a decent majority in the 
House. The two leaders have much in common. Both 
lead divided parties. Both want to respect the outcome 
of the referendum. Neither wants a second referendum 
nor, at least yet, a general election. There is broad scope 
for a pragmatic compromise between them, on the one 
hand, and between them and an EU desperate to reach 
a deal, on the other. There remain four issues to deal 
with: trade policy, the customs union, the movement of 
people, and the Irish backstop. 
TRADE
It is a weakness in the government’s strategy that it puts 
so much reliance on the wholly unproven success of its 
global “independent” trade policy. The fact is that few 
third countries are willing to favour a free trade pact with 
the UK over their free trade agreements with the EU bloc. 
Even rolling over the EU’s multilateral trade treaties into 
bilateral treaties with the British is problematic.  
The prime minister should drop from 
the Political Declaration language that 
simply reiterates earlier red lines.
“I am not clear”, Mrs May retorted to Mr Corbyn, “why 
you believe it would be preferable to seek a say in future 
EU trade deals rather than the ability to strike our own 
deals?”. The hard reality of international commercial 
negotiations will provide her with an answer. 
The prime minister should drop from the Political 
Declaration language that simply reiterates earlier red 
lines. While it is perfectly sensible for the UK to adopt 
an ambitious trade policy, it serves little at this stage 
to stress that its trade must always be “independent” 
(paragraphs 4, 17). Some accommodation can surely 
be found through the revised Declaration to promise 
the UK more of “a say” in EU trade deals than is, for 
example, now afforded to Turkey, whose customs union 
agreement with the EU (1995) is asymmetric to the 
point of being unfair. 
CUSTOMS
The degree to which the UK will cohere to the EU’s 
common commercial policy and external tariff is 
dependent on the nature and closeness of the future 
customs arrangements. In her letter, Theresa May 
reminded Jeremy Corbyn that paragraph 23 of the 
Political Declaration “explicitly provides for the benefits 
of a customs union”. She underlined in the House that 
she disagrees with the leader of the opposition that the 
UK should remain a member of the EU customs union. 
“I would gently point out that the House of 
Commons has already voted against this. 
And in any case, membership of the Customs 
Union would be a less desirable outcome than 
that which is provided for in the Political 
Declaration. That would deliver no tariffs, fees, 
charges or quantitative restrictions across all 
sectors, and no checks on rules of origin.”
The irony is that Mrs May claims that “one of our key 
negotiating objectives” is to secure “frictionless” trade 
with the EU in goods and agri-food products. She accepts 
a permanent customs union type agreement with the EU 
for goods while preserving autonomy for international 
trade deals in services. 
Although in this digital age the practical distinction 
between trade in goods and trade in services is less 
clear than it once was, there is no reason why a 
customs union or free trade agreement cannot be 
limited to goods – as, indeed, the GATT and related 
WTO agreements are. Mrs May intends that the UK 
will be free to contract with third countries as it 
wishes on issues outside the customs agreement it 
strikes with the EU. 
The Political Declaration already foresees the 
negotiation of a permanent customs union for goods, 
not least in order to avoid the return of a hard border 
in Ireland and to maintain industrial supply chains. 
The new customs arrangements, building on the single 
customs territory envisaged in the Irish backstop, will 
be tailored exactly to fit whatever is the negotiated 
outcome of the trade talks. It will be a customs union 
like no other: the UK will not be staying in the EU’s 
existing customs union. The obvious outcome of 
an ambitious, comprehensive free trade agreement, 
which Mrs May wants, is a new customs union, which 
Mr Corbyn wants (paragraph 79).  
The obvious outcome of an ambitious, 
comprehensive free trade agreement, 
which Mrs May wants, is a new customs 
union, which Mr Corbyn wants. 
Mr Corbyn would be wise not to insist on the term 
“customs union”. That “we are leaving the single market 
and the customs union” has become one of Mrs May’s 
most repeated sound bites, making it difficult for her to 
retreat. Best to call it a “customs accord” (paragraph 26). 
MOBILITY
Mrs May also challenges Mr Corbyn on the free 
movement of people. She wrote:
“The fundamental negotiating challenge here 
is the EU’s position that completely frictionless 
6trade is only possible if the UK stays in the 
single market. This would mean accepting free 
movement, which Labour’s 2017 General Election 
manifesto made clear you do not support.” 
It is indeed a liability in Labour’s policy which it seems 
not to acknowledge that, according to the seminal 
Article 26(2) TFEU, the single market comprises an 
“area without internal frontiers in which the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured”. At least Mr Corbyn appears to have dropped, 
by way of compromise, his previous objections to EU 
state-aids and competition policies.  
A more open approach by the UK 
to arrangements that allow for the 
mobility of workers and their families, 
on a reciprocal basis, would do much 
to soften the Commission’s negotiating 
position on services.
From an economic point of view, the big flaw in the 
Political Declaration is the lack of attention paid to 
the potential of free trade in services. This is a natural 
consequence of the British refusal to accept the free 
movement of those EU citizens who, for the most part, 
deliver services and establish firms. 
It would therefore be helpful if the UK felt it no longer 
necessary to emphasise that it opposes freedom of 
movement (paragraph 4). A more open approach by 
the UK to arrangements that allow for the mobility 
of workers and their families, on a reciprocal basis, 
would do much to soften the Commission’s negotiating 
position on services (paragraph 50). 
POSITIVE REASSURANCE
Responding to criticisms of the Political Declaration 
that it is too conditional and tentative, the language 
can be made less weasely and more positive throughout. 
So “could” becomes “should”, and “should” or “would” 
becomes “will” or “must”. The tone of the document is 
transformed by such sub-editing. Frequent euphemistic 
mention of “final relationship” would be better 
rendered as “Association Agreement”. 
Additional paragraphs could usefully spell out 
the central objective of the new deep and special 
partnership, as follows: 
5a. The aim of the economic partnership will be to promote 
trade and investment between the Parties and with 
third countries. The Association Agreement will include 
arrangements for a deep and comprehensive free trade 
area and a customs accord, taking into account a degree 
of regulatory alignment that will be determined in the 
course of its negotiation. Given their high level of economic 
interdependence, the Parties agree to work together for the 
sustainable development of Europe, based on a competitive 
social market economy aiming at full employment and social 
progress. They are committed to combatting global warming.
5b. The aim of the security partnership will be to promote 
peace, freedom and justice. The Association Agreement will 
ensure the close cooperation of the Parties with a view to 
maintaining internal and external security for their citizens 
and states. It will provide for regular dialogue and possible 
joint action in the fight against crime and terrorism. It will 
enable the continuing development of close relations in 
foreign, security and defence policies, while respecting the 
constitutional autonomy of the Parties and their current 
and future obligations under international law.
To reassure the sceptics, reassurance can be given on 
constitutional matters. Brexit, after all, means Brexit:
4a. Cooperation between the Parties in the framework of 
the Association Agreement shall respect the constitutional, 
legal and political autonomy and identity of the United 
Kingdom and of the European Union and its Member States.
As Mr Corbyn suggests in his letter, with which Mrs 
May concurs, amendments can be made to the text that 
serve to strengthen the UK’s continuing commitment to 
non-regression in terms of workers’ rights and consumer 
and environmental standards, enhancing respect for the 
concept of the level playing field (paragraph 79, 79a). 
Intentions with regard to political and operational 
cooperation in the fields of internal and external 
security can be enhanced. Reference to the EAW, ECRIS 
and SIS II should be made specific (paragraphs 87, 89].  
  
To reassure the sceptics, reassurance 
can be given on constitutional matters. 
Brexit, after all, means Brexit.
Future participation in EU programmes and agencies 
can be fleshed out, alongside stronger UK commitment 
to a new, trustworthy regulatory framework of its own, 
independent of ministerial direction (paragraphs 24, 
24a, 60, 61). Both parties should commit in principle 
to negotiating the readmission of the UK to the EIB 
(paragraph 15) and to the Galileo project (paragraph 107). 
LEGAL STANDING
The prime minister is right to want to upgrade the soft 
law status of the Political Declaration. A new paragraph 
can be added to affirm that the Declaration is politically 
binding on both parties, committing them accordingly to 
give the Declaration appropriate legal recognition in their 
respective instruments of ratification (paragraph 1a). 
7A further helpful device would be a third document to 
act as a formal legal bridge between the Withdrawal 
Agreement and the Political Declaration. This 
measure would spell out how the Declaration is to be 
implemented in practice, using the transition period 
provided for by the Withdrawal Agreement to negotiate 
the final treaty. It would deploy the Joint Committee 
to assess any new customs arrangements designed to 
annul the need for the Irish backstop.
Such a legally binding implementing protocol would be 
annexed to the Withdrawal Agreement in the way that, 
for reasons we know, the Political Declaration itself 
cannot be (paragraphs 1b, 138).5  
A further helpful device would be a third 
document to act as a formal legal bridge 
between the Withdrawal Agreement and 
the Political Declaration. 
The revised Political Declaration could accentuate 
the joint nature of the envisaged governance of the 
association agreement, along with its democratic 
character (paragraphs 5c, 123a, 124a, 129). The 
implementation protocol should provide details of 
the role of the Joint Committee during the transition 
period and beyond. If the UK is to have Mr Corbyn’s 
“say” in EU trade policy, it will be through the working 
of these joint institutions based on the template of the 
Ukraine Association Agreement of 2014. 
THE IRISH BACKSTOP
Upgrading the legal and political importance of 
the Political Declaration caters effectively with the 
controversy over the Irish backstop (without having to 
reopen the Withdrawal Agreement). Extra paragraphs 
could justify the Irish backstop in terms less occluded 
than those found in the Withdrawal Agreement, 
making clear that the backstop has the dual purpose 
of protecting both the EU single market and the 
Good Friday Agreement. In the context of the future 
association agreement, the backstop will become 
redundant (paragraphs 5e, 5f, 19, 19b, 139).  
Upgrading the legal and political 
importance of the Political Declaration 
caters effectively with the controversy 
over the Irish backstop.
The search for technological solutions to manage 
borderless customs, so beloved of Brexiteers, could be 
made subject to a joint enquiry (and not left to the UK’s 
lonely best endeavours) (paragraph 19a).  
The only alternative to the backstop 
is for the UK to accept even closer 
alignment with the EU than that 
envisaged in the Political Declaration.
A clause should be added to the Declaration and the 
implementation protocol to recall that the association 
agreement can partially enter into force on a 
provisional basis, before all ratification procedures 
are complete, in particular to avoid unnecessary 
default to the backstop (paragraph 138a).
If a legally sound compromise along these lines is not 
agreed by the Commons, there will be no deal. The 
only alternative to the backstop is for the UK to accept 
even closer alignment with the EU than that envisaged 
in the Political Declaration. Neither Mrs May nor Mr 
Corbyn want that. 
THE TICKING CLOCK
Theresa May says she has no intention of asking for 
an extension of Article 50. Those who voted to set the 
clock ticking two years ago, but have since rejected 
the Withdrawal Agreement, accuse her of “running 
down the clock”.  
If a compromise on the Political 
Declaration is not reached, and there 
is no UK ratification of the deal, the 
European Council is unlikely to agree to a 
panicky and purposeless short extension. 
If a compromise on the Political Declaration is reached, 
the British parliament has to ratify the Withdrawal 
Agreement before 29 March. In that event, for reasons 
of domestic legislation, the UK will have to request 
a three-month extension of the Article 50 timetable. 
The European Council would be inclined to agree to 
this unanimously at its next scheduled meeting on 
21-22 March.6 A short prolongation of the timetable 
to complete the orderly secession would allow the 
European Parliament time to vote its consent to the 
package before the last working day of its current term, 
which is 17 April. The Council could then smoothly 
complete the legal processes before 30 June. 
If a compromise on the Political Declaration is not 
reached, and there is no UK ratification of the deal, the 
8European Council is unlikely to agree to a panicky and 
purposeless short extension. And there will certainly be 
no agreement to permit the British a rolling extension. 
Instead, the 27 leaders would have to consider  
whether to offer the UK a one-off longer extension of 
Article 50 in order to avoid no deal and give the Brits one 
last chance. But an extension into and beyond the autumn 
of 2019 would oblige the UK to continue to negotiate 
Brexit while at the same time holding elections to the 
European Parliament, appointing a new Commissioner 
and re-engaging in difficult budgetary discussions.  
A long extension would be sure to 
provoke a very strong reaction in British 
public opinion.
A long extension would be sure to provoke a very 
strong reaction in British public opinion. The 
nationalist pot would be well stirred. The EU would be 
accused of trapping the UK inside the EU against its 
will. In such heated circumstances political consensus 
at Westminster would be much harder to reach even 
than it is today. 
DIVISIVE POPULISM
A lengthy extension of Article 50 would excite calls 
among Remainers to hold a second referendum. That 
would be a bad mistake. Another plebiscite would 
escalate the crisis for those political parties that 
had recourse to it, further enfeebling Britain’s once 
proud system of parliamentary government. Another 
referendum would leave the nation even more divided 
in terms of class, province and generation. If Scotland 
and Northern Ireland again voted contrary to England, 
the dissolution of the United Kingdom might follow.  
The Brexiteers are raring to go  
yellow-vested, armed with their slogan 
“Tell Them Again!”.
A second In/Out referendum would bamboozle the 
financial markets and investors. It would destabilise 
the politics of the European Union. And all the polling 
evidence suggests that it would be unlikely to settle 
the question of Britain’s European future in a stable 
and intelligent way. 
The referendum campaign would be at best messy, at 
worst anarchy. Remainers are unable to agree among 
themselves about the question to be put in a second 
popular vote. Remainers and Leavers would quarrel 
about the referendum’s rules of conduct. 
Remainers would also struggle to vindicate their 
decision to overturn the 2016 referendum they once 
promoted and whose verdict they pledged to respect. By 
contrast, the Brexiteers are raring to go yellow-vested, 
armed with their slogan “Tell Them Again!”.
European Council President Donald Tusk was right to 
conclude (6 February) that: 
“The facts are unmistakable … Today there is 
no political force and no effective leadership for 
Remain. I say this without satisfaction, but you 
can’t argue with the facts”. 
The next more or less meaningful vote in the Commons 




2 See my previous EPC paper, Brexit: How the Political Declaration can rescue the 






5 A proposal for such an implementing protocol was presented by Kenneth 
Armstrong, Professor of European law in the University of Cambridge, at a 
seminar on 7 February at 39 Essex Chambers. 
6 In these circumstances, the decision of the European Council under Article 
50(3) to allow a short extension would include a derogation to permit the UK 
not to hold elections to the European Parliament on 23-26 May.
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